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1. Introduction 
The term “Big Science” identifies the style of scientific analysis characterizing much research 
in physics, astronomy and biology after World War II (Dennis, 2017). Big Science Centers 
(BSC) typically rely on large-scale instruments and research infrastructures, have a long list 
of participating institutions, attract generous funding from governments or international 
agencies and involve numerous industrial partners to develop the technologies required for 
research purposes. This last characteristic makes BSC a natural testing ground for assessing 
the effectiveness of Public Procurement for Innovation (PPI) as driver of firms’ innovation 
output. In fact, public procurement through BSC is a form of PPI (see e.g. Aschhoff and 
Sofka, 2009
1
; Edquist and Hommen, 2000 for an overview of innovation policies). 
Providing empirical evidence that procurement through BSC affects the innovation 
output of firms is key for governments contributing to their budgets. In fact, BSC are financed 
not only for the promise of significant scientific discoveries, but also in the hope that a radical 
technological innovation - yielding spillovers in different application domains (Dahlin and 
Behrens, 2005) - might arise as a side-effect while attempting to advance human knowledge 
(Hallonsten, 2014). The search for breakthrough or general-purpose technologies is an 
important target of innovation policies (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). Being sources of 
aggregate productivity growth (Crépon et al., 1998), R&D and innovation represent key 
drivers of short - and medium-term business cycle fluctuations (Basu et al., 2006; Comin and 
Gertler, 2006; Kung and Schmid, 2015) and forces affecting long-run economic growth 
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Schaefer et al., 2014). 
There are both opportunities and challenges for BSC industrial partners: the latter are 
required to deliver new products with technology specifications developed for scientific 
                                                             
1 Aschhoff and Sofka (2009) compares four public policies to stimulate innovation: public procurement, 
regulation, R&D subsidies, and subsidies to universities and research institutions. They find a positive effect of 
public procurement on market opportunities, and no difference between public procurement and access to 
knowledge created by universities and research institutes. The other channels seem to be less effective 
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purposes and for which a market might not yet exist. Consequently, there are risks related to 
the specificity of the technology developed for the BSC that might not be immediately 
exploited in other markets.  
On the other hand, beneficial effects on the medium - long-term innovation output of 
suppliers might also arise. In fact, innovation and entrepreneurship might emerge from BSC 
through three main channels: (i) technological breakthroughs leading to start-ups and spin-
offs involving BSC employees; (ii) inventions and patents filed by researchers at universities 
collaborating with the BSC; (iii) new business opportunities for BSC industrial partners. In 
some cases, these three channels may overlap (e.g. suppliers which employ former BSC staff 
or that are spin-offs of universities involved in experiments at the BSC).  
In this paper we focus on the third channel, that is the effect of procurement through 
BSC on the output of firms’ innovation activity as measured by patents.2 We exploit a unique 
dataset with information about suppliers of the European Organization for Nuclear Research 
(CERN) as well as 28 case studies collected with face-to-face interviews to CERN industrial 
partners (Sirtori et al., 2019). CERN features a unique combination of both PPI and scientific 
research. The novelty of the scientific equipment needed at CERN to advance the frontier of 
research in physics is such that it is not obvious that its industrial partners will be able to 
benefit from such a collaboration. CERN suppliers face entirely new technological challenges 
that often require to advance the technological frontier, to acquire new scientific knowledge 
through R&D and develop radical innovations. The probability that firms can profit from their 
collaboration with CERN in the medium - long-term depends on their ability to enrich their 
absorptive capacity over time. Absorptive capacity captures firms’ ability to absorb external 
knowledge and hence to benefit from the interaction process with a BSC (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Yet, the enrichment over time of firms’ absorptive capacity is a necessary 
                                                             
2 See e.g. Crépon et al. (1998), Aghion et al. (2013) and Jia et al. (2019) for the use of patents as a proxy 
innovation output. 
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but not sufficient condition for an industrial partner to catalyse benefits originating from the 
procurement relationship with CERN. In particular, whether the experience gained through 
the interaction with CERN can be translated into innovations with a sizeable economic value 
remains an open issue.  
The aim of the paper is twofold. First, we estimate survival and count data models to 
determine the impact of CERN procurement on the hazard to patent for the first time and on 
the number of patents filed by CERN suppliers. The fact that firms in our sample received the 
first order from CERN over a long-time span (1995-2008) delivers a natural partition of 
industrial partners into “suppliers” and “not yet suppliers”. The time variation in the firms’ 
status can thus be exploited to trace the impact of CERN on patenting activity. Second, 
besides evaluating the impact of CERN procurement on its industrial partners’ patenting 
activity, we also investigate the average time-lag that separates CERN procurement from the 
filing date of a patent application. Specifically, we focus on the time that separates the start of 
the procurement relationship with CERN to the patent application date - if any - that proxies 
the end of the R&D project. In the parlance of Pakes and Shankerman (1984) this time lag is 
known as “gestation lag”.3  
The question pertaining to the time lag is relevant for policy makers who decide how 
much to invest in BSC based on member countries’ investment returns. As shown by previous 
literature, the quantification of both the social and private rates of return to research rely on 
estimates of such time-lags. Mansfield (1968) used the time lags between the investment in 
academic research and the industrial utilization of their findings in the computation of the 
social rate of return to academic research. Pakes and Schankerman (1984) showed that the 
time lag between the deployment of research resources and the beginning of the stream of 
                                                             
3
 These authors define the “total R&D lag” as the average time between the beginning of R&D expenditure and 
the start of the associated revenue stream. They further decompose the “total R&D lag” into the lag between 
project inception and completion - the “gestation lag” - and the time from project completion to commercial 
application - the “application lag”. 
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private revenues from their commercial applications heavily influences the private rate of 
return to research. Griliches (1979) surveyed the econometric literature concerned with the 
estimation of the return to R&D and highlighted that the comparisons across empirical 
analyses is difficult due to the variability of the assumption related with time lag R&D effects. 
We contribute to the literature on the impact of BSC on technological innovation in 
two ways. First, we advance knowledge on the innovative outcomes generated by BSC, 
focusing on patents. Although, recently, the economic literature has increasingly focused its 
attention on the impact of BSC procurement on industrial partners, this remains an under-
researched area. Secondly, we shed new light on the time required for the BSC suppliers to 
“absorb” the technological content of the order and translate it into a potentially marketable 
innovation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that tackles such an issue in 
the case of BSC. The topic is investigated combining both qualitative and quantitative 
research techniques. Case studies allow us to take a closer look at different features of the 
interaction process between CERN and its suppliers and exploit “soft information” relevant to 
the design of our research hypotheses and econometric analysis. 
We attain two main results: first, our investigation shows that a “CERN effect” does 
exist and is associated with an increase in both the hazard to file a patent for the first time and 
the number of patent applications; second, such effect is statistically significant only with a 
delay of some years from the beginning of the procurement relationship. The existence of a 
time-lag (i.e. 5 – 8 years) between CERN procurement and innovation confirms some 
evidence derived from our case-studies by signaling that learning from technologies at the 
frontier of science and translating such new knowledge into commercial applications is a 
medium-run process. This points to an absorption mechanism requiring protracted learning 
and adaptation. As underlined by Hameri and Vuola (1996: 131), while incremental 
innovation may easily access the market, “the incubation times for revenues from a new 
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technological application range from several years up to a decade, depending on the novelty 
of the solution”. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents CERN 
procurement practices, while Section 2.1 reviews the relevant literature on the impact of 
CERN procurement on industrial partners’ sales, innovation, productivity and profitability. In 
Section 2.2 we go through case studies to uncover interaction process features and illustrate 
collaborative mechanisms between CERN and its industrial partners; afterwards, in Section 
2.3, we illustrate opportunities and challenges arising for BSC suppliers and their 
consequences for learning and innovation. Against this background, in Section 2.4 we outline 
our research questions and hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical strategy; 
Section 4 illustrates the results and several robustness checks, while Section 5 concludes. An 
Appendix with further details on the data and additional results completes the paper. 
 
2. CERN: background and procurement policies  
CERN - founded after World War II with the aim of studying the basic constituents of matter 
-operates the largest particle physics laboratory in the world and is a leading example of BSC. 
CERN research is publicly funded by 23 Member States according to their Gross Domestic 
Product. In turn, Member States expect an industrial return proportional to their contribution 
to CERN annual budget. CERN’s experimental collaborations4 involve over 17,500 people 
belonging to about 1,500 institutes from all over the world (CERN, 2018). The construction 
cost of its main research infrastructure - the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) – was more than 4 
billion of Swiss Francs (CERN, 2019b). During the 1995-2015 period CERN collaborated 
with over 4,200 firms (CERN, 2019a), hence representing an ideal testing ground to 
investigate whether BSC generate industrial knowledge spillovers. 
                                                             
4 There are seven experiments at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) each addressing different research issues in 
particle physics. These are ATLAS, CMS, ALICE, LHCb, TOTEM, LHCf, and MoEDAL. 
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Several technologies, some of which completely innovative, were developed to build 
and operate the LHC. CERN procurement contracts have led to technological advances in 
superconductivity, cryogenics, electromagnets, ultra-high vacuum, distributed computing, 
rad-resistance materials, and fast electronics (Evans, 2009; Giudice, 2010). It follows that 
many of CERN procurement contracts require cutting-edge technologies and radical 
innovations combined with an intense collaboration with its industrial suppliers. CERN 
suppliers are exposed “to a highly diverse knowledge environment” (Autio et al., 2004: 110) 
which could positively impact on their expected future innovativeness, productivity and 
profitability. Procurement through CERN is thus not a form of “general public procurement” 
(i.e. buying off-the-shelf products), but rather a form of PPI. PPI shapes the demand 
environment and the economic landscape in which suppliers operate and can also impact on 
the innovation output of BSC’s industrial partners (Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010). 
 
2.1 Brief literature review on the economic effects of CERN procurement 
The effects of CERN procurement on the innovation output of its industrial partners has been 
investigated with a variety of methodologies ranging from case studies to econometric 
analyses: the consensus view emerging from this strand of the literature points to the 
existence of a positive association between CERN procurement and firms’ innovation output. 
A survey of CERN suppliers showed that collaboration with CERN contributed -along 
with other factors - to product innovation and new R&D (Autio, 2014). Castelnovo et al 
(2018) relied on a simultaneous equation model to show that after becoming CERN industrial 
partners, firms generally experienced a rise in R&D, patents, productivity, and profits. Florio 
et al. (2018) showed that CERN procurement significantly affects suppliers’ innovative 
performance when a relational governance is in place through cooperative relations (i.e. 
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exchanges implying that CERN and suppliers regularly cooperate to deal with complex 
information that is not easily transmitted or learned). 
Based on evidence from 14 Swedish firms, Aberg and Bengston (2015) pointed out 
that firms’ product and process innovation occurs mostly when a development project is in 
place, (i.e. when CERN invites firms to participate in developing products that cannot be 
bought off-the-shelf). Vuola and Hameri (2006: 3) relied on nine in-depth case studies and 
concluded that CERN is “a most fertile ground to enable and boost industrial innovation”. 
Autio et al. (2014), based on three in depth case-studies, found innovation benefits accruing to 
the firms involved by CERN through prototypes’ mocking up and experimentation. Closely 
related contributions are those by Amaldi (2012), Nielsen and Anelli (2016), and Battistoni et 
al., (2016) highlighting that thanks to the collaboration with CERN several firms were 
subsequently able to develop new products for customers in other markets. 
While, as already mentioned the consensus is that there is a positive economic impact 
of CERN procurement on its suppliers, there is scant evidence on the challenges, risks, and 
the “gestation lag” of the innovation process related with procurement through BSCs. 
  
2.2 CERN procurement: features and challenges. 
A very recent survey – co-authored by one of the authors of this paper – collected 28 case 
studies with in-depth face-to-face interviews to representatives of CERN’s suppliers that 
received at least one order since 1995 (Sirtori et al., 2019). See Appendix A1 for details about 
the companies involved in the analysis. 
The orders are related either to the construction and upgrade of the LHC or to other CERN 
research programmes. We draw from these case studies to illustrate three special features that 
characterize the relation between CERN and its industrial partners: (i) transfers of human 
capital; (ii) transfers of experience; (iii) openness of knowledge. 
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Transfer of human capital. Mutual trust and the exchange of knowledge between 
CERN and firms is enhanced by the understanding of scientists and engineers to be part of the 
same experimental context, even when they play different roles in the procurement relation 
(see Tuertscher, 2014). Human capital flows from CERN to the industrial partner. For 
example, the technical director and co-founder of a Spanish firm that delivered components 
for the quadrupole magnets of the LHC, is a former CERN senior engineer. An Italian firm, 
specialized in electronic devices, was founded by engineers working in the 1970s at the 
Italian Institute for Nuclear Research (INFN) and CERN. A Spanish micro-firm with just 10 
employees was created by former doctoral students involved in an experiment at CERN, and 
later from their collaboration in radiation detection at three research institutes: the Barcelona 
Institute of Microelectronics (IMB-CNM) and the Institute of Particle Physics in Valencia and 
the University of Liverpool.
5
 Without such exchange of human capital, trust and flows of 
knowledge would be much more difficult. 
Transfer of experience. Experience gained through procurement is transferable 
between BSC and beyond. There is a contagion effect within the extremely selective market 
of hi-tech procurement for BSC based on reputation earned at CERN. For instance, an 
Austrian software company, providing supervisory control and data acquisition systems, 
reported benefits arising from the fact that when CERN scientists returned to their national 
institutions, they spread the word about the functionality and performance of their software. 
This helped to acquire new customers including leading centers for hadron-therapy of cancer 
in Austria and Italy, and with the ITER fusion experiment in France. An Italian company, 
after providing cryostats for CERN, was able to enter a collaboration with the ITER fusion 
project. Similarly, a German company reported to collaborate not only with CERN but also 
with other BSC such as DESY and the GSI Helmholtz Centre for Heavy Ion Research. Even a 
                                                             
5 The CERN Alumni website (https://alumni.cern) reports many other similar examples. 
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branch of a big multinational company, after developing new products and customizing 
existing ones (i.e. providing insulation and protection equipment) for CERN, was then able to 
exploit such products in other markets. Reputation earned with a BSC is recognized elsewhere 
because scientists and engineers share a common background and understand how 
challenging it is to be involved in procurement at the frontier of science. 
Openness of knowledge. The BSC environment creates an unusual circulation of 
knowledge. An interview with representatives of a multinational supplier revealed that: “by 
interacting frequently with CERN staff, the company has also improved its organizational 
capabilities. In particular, it has learned the value of working closely with its customers – 
cooperating on some activities, including on product design, but also visiting their sites in 
person, to see where the procured products are actually used. Such field work is often 
impossible in industry projects, because of the strict confidentiality. Nevertheless, it is 
essential to ensure clear communication and to deliver precisely what the customer requires” 
(Sirtori et al., 2019, p. 61). 
An Austrian software company reported that their relationship with CERN went well 
beyond the usual customer–supplier relationship, making it more similar to a partnership. The 
company has subsequently joined “CERN Openlab” (https://openlab.cern), a public-private 
partnership to explore new ideas for future R&D projects. A software multinational firm, 
acknowledges that CERN played the role of lead user, thus improving the final quality of its 
products. These examples point to a knowledge environment which is more open than the 
usual business context. 
Overall, most of the representatives interviewed declared that the relation with CERN 
had “high effect” both in improving the technical know-how (75%) and the reputation (64%) 
of firms. However, the interviews also highlight that the impact of CERN on sales or new 
customers’ acquisition is not as strong as its effects on firms’ technical know-how and 
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reputation. This difference is interesting and suggests that some critical issues are often 
overlooked by the previous literature. It thus seems naive to conclude that procurement 
through BSC immediately translates into marketable innovations. 
 
2.3 Challenges and risks 
Some of the suppliers interviewed by Sirtori et al. (2019) reported that the collaboration with 
CERN has been challenging, costly, risky, and was not necessarily financially profitable in 
the short term. A superconductor manufacturer (part of a German company with 6,000 
employees active in life science and analytical systems) supplied super-conducting cables for 
three generations of CERN particle accelerators (LEP in the 1980s, the LHC in the 1990s, 
HL-LHC currently), and is now involved in the conceptual design of the Future Circular 
Collider. Despite this long experience, the firm’s representatives reported that the company 
had to manage high uncertainties in time and costs associated with some new technologies 
requested by CERN. Such a high degree of uncertainty required frequent interactions with 
CERN scientists and engineers. This is often the unavoidable side-effect of the learning 
benefits from BSC. Orders for off-the-shelf products are entirely specified and uncertainty is 
minimal, however contracts for highly customized products require several adjustments. 
Overall, CERN’s orders for this company were not particularly profitable and, after their 
delivery, the company needed to downsize the number of its employees to adjust for new 
market conditions. Another Italian company confirmed that investing in R&D for a product 
whose precise technical requirements are not available, implies highly uncertain 
manufacturing costs and revenues. This has led to financial losses for this company.  
A Swiss based company specialized in vacuum creation and gas-management has 
collaborated with CERN since the 1960s. Some of the orders from CERN for vacuum 
technologies were costly and risky for the company; this explains why the representatives of 
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this firm declared that now they carefully evaluate whether to participate in a tender for 
CERN procurement contracts. The volume of the order and the schedule for its delivery are 
key elements in this decision and risks need to be compared with learning benefits and 
potential profits in other markets. An Italian company that has collaborated with CERN and 
other BSC reported that orders that are less technically challenging often yield higher profits, 
while learning opportunities are higher when the level of customization is higher. 
Another challenge is related to subcontracting. For example, a Portuguese company 
specializing in energy production storage equipment had to involve subcontractors and to 
collaborate with other suppliers to fully meet CERN’s stringent technological requirements. 
This required intensive interactions with CERN, new investment, training of its own staff to 
test new tools and solutions, selection and coordination with other firms. The need to involve 
subcontractors or to act as part of consortium adds complexity in the governance of the 
procurement relation and ultimately increases the uncertainty. 
To provide further examples of why uncertainties and costs arise for suppliers, one 
may consider the following case stuies. An Austrian civil engineering company was required 
by CERN to keep two caverns where equipment had to be located as close as possible to 
minimize the length of optical cables needed for data transfer. While this choice is optimal 
from an Information Technology perspective, it revealed to be a particularly challenging task 
for civil engineers (i.e. less rock between caverns reduces the support of the structure). The 
company had to design new solutions for reinforcement but at a later stage it discovered that 
the rock itself had many soft layers and hence a sophisticated and costly groundwater control-
system was necessary to prevent unexpected flooding during excavation. A second example is 
provided by a German company that had to develop an entirely new high-temperature 
furnace. After intensive and frequent interaction between the CERN’s staff and the company, 
the furnace was designed, manufactured and delivered. This took 53 weeks of dedicated 
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effort. A Dutch company specialized in aluminum technologies was required to design and 
manufacture a support structure for the LHC cryostats. There was no previous experience to 
comply with the required standards and the company had to employ special manufacturing 
equipment and techniques. Moreover, it also had to carry out R&D to understand how to treat 
aluminum at extremely low temperatures (LHC operates at 1.9 degrees Kelvin, lower than the 
vacuum in outer space). This extreme requirement needed additional costly investments for 
the firm.  
These examples highlight some perhaps less known side-effects of technological 
learning through BSC procurement. It is an expensive process that requires frequent 
interactions with the BSC, additional R&D, specific fixed investment, training costs, use of 
subcontractors and financial risk. Moreover, customized solutions may not prove profitable in 
other markets. The high degree of uncertainty about how, when and if all these costs will be 
balanced by additional gains has inspired our research hypotheses about the gestation lags 
from procurement to innovation output. 
 
2.4 Research hypotheses 
Findings from our case studies suggest that collaborating with BSC involves a risk-return 
trade-off. On the one hand, BSC industrial partners might experience benefits related to 
technological learning and reputational effects that can potentially be exploited in their 
relations with other BSC or customers in different markets. On the other hand, entering in a 
contract with a BSC is not entirely without risk for suppliers. In fact, procurement contracts 
for technologies required to advance the frontier of science are often not profitable in the 
short-term. How benefits and costs will be balanced in the medium - long-term is uncertain. 
Firms engage in contracts with a BSC such as CERN not only for an immediate profit, but 
also with the expectation of future competitive advantages, which would require further steps. 
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This suggests that there might be a time lag that separates the beginning of the relation with 
the BSC and actual economic gains arising from it. 
In this paper we focus on the time distance that runs from the first procurement 
contract to its completion, as measured by the filing date of a patent, if any. While, as far as 
we know, there is no previous literature on BSC-specific “gestation lag”, several papers 
investigated the time lag associated with the commercial exploitation of academic research. 
Mansfield (1991, 1998) reported that the mean time interval between the relevant academic 
research and the first commercial introduction of new products or processes is 6-7 years. The 
estimated time span between the appearance of academic research and its effect on 
productivity in the form of knowledge absorbed by an industry might be even longer, on 
average approximately 20 years (Adams, 1990). In the case of computer science and 
engineering – two cases that are especially relevant also for what concerns CERN – the time 
lag is 10 years (Adams, 1990). Heher (2006) showed that it can take up to 10 years for an 
institution, and 20 years nationally, to attain a positive rate of return from an investment in 
research and technology transfer. In the pharmaceutical industry the time-lag between 
research, development, and commercialization can reach up to 20 years (see Sternitzke, 2010 
and Toole, 2012). In contrast, earlier analyses by Pakes and Griliches (1980), Hausman et al. 
(1984), Hall et al. (1984) reported that about a year is necessary for translating R&D 
expenditure into a patent application. 
What happens in the BSC context? The following research hypotheses seem to be 
justified by the previous qualitative discussion and earlier literature: 
H1. Firms engaged in a procurement relation with a BSC - such as CERN - learn to 
develop new technologies through the co-development of designs related to 
procurement contracts. This learning process ultimately leads to an innovation 
output, against initial R&D expenditure and other costs faced by firms. 
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H2. Given the idiosyncratic nature of the new developments arising from the 
procurement for a BSC, the subsequent potential adaptation and application to other 
customers takes significant time and effort to produce potentially marketable 
innovation output. 
The empirical proxy of innovation output we used to test H1 is the number of patent 
applications filed by CERN suppliers after the start of the procurement relation with CERN. 
Patents are widely used as a proxy of innovation output (see e.g. Crépon et al., 1998; Aghion 
et al., 2013; Jia et al., 2019), although they may underestimate the innovation effect of BSC 
procurement since many firms might not patent their innovations or use alternative forms of 
intellectual property protection (see e.g. Dziallas and Blind, 2019 for a critical overview of 
innovation indicators). Our empirical proxy for testing H2 is the gestation lag: namely, the 
time that separates the beginning of an R&D project and its completion. We assume that the 
beginning of the procurement relation with CERN marks the starting date of a specific R&D 
project, while the patent application date - if any - represents its conclusion. We thus want to 
empirically assess the likelihood that CERN suppliers are able to increase their patenting 
activity (H1) and how long is the gestation lag needed to absorb the new ideas and translate 
them into potentially marketable innovations (H2). 
 
3. Data and Empirical strategy 
3.1 Data 
We have assembled a unique dataset collecting information on firms collaborating at the 
development of the world biggest research infrastructure: the LHC, and some related projects 
at CERN. The LHC project was approved by the CERN council in December 1994, while the 
LHC Conceptual Design Report, which detailed the architecture and operation of the LHC, 
was published in October 1995. The experiments at the LHC started in September 2008 and in 
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July 2012 the discovery of the Higg’s boson – for which François Englert and Peter Higgs 
were awarded with the 2013 Nobel Prize in physics - was announced to the public. 
Our dataset summarizes information from three sources. First, the CERN Procurement 
and Industrial Services Group – that is in charge of coordinating all the supplies and services 
that the laboratory needs – maintains a database that we used to identify firms that over the 
1995-2008 period received at least one LHC-related order above 10,000 CHF.
6
 We exploited 
this database also for retrieving the date that marks the beginning of the procurement 
relationship, the “activity codes" used by CERN to classify purchases from its suppliers, the 
number and the total amount of LHC-related orders. 
Second, we sourced balance sheet data for LHC suppliers from the ORBIS database 
maintained by Bureau van Dijk. We collected information on the geographical location, size 
and sector of activity (based on NACE 2 digits codes) of firms, as well as data on the amount 
of their intangible fixed assets. Firms’ intangible fixed assets in the ORBIS database comprise 
all intangible assets such as formation expenses, research expenses, goodwill, development 
expenses and all other expenses with a long-term effect. Lastly, we retrieved the number of 
patents filed by LHC suppliers each year from the PATSTAT database. 
The process of merging data from the CERN procurement database, ORBIS and 
PATSTAT left us with a panel dataset with 896 firms out of 1296 that have collaborated with 
CERN at the construction of the LHC. See Section 3.2 for further details on the sample 
design. For each year in the 1995-2008 period, Figure 1 shows the number of firms that have 
received their first LHC-related order. As we can see, except for 1995-96 and 2007-08, firms 
are almost uniformly distributed over time. 
 
                                                             
6 The rationale for excluding low value orders is that they are unlikely to generate knowledge spillovers for 
firms. Moreover, notice that experimental collaborations, such as ATLAS and CMS, have some procurement 
autonomy, so their orders are not covered here, except when they are directly managed by CERN. For additional 
details see: http://procurement.web.cern.ch/procurement-strategy-and-policy 
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Figure 1. Time distribution of LHC-related orders: 1995-2008 
 
Notes: for each year in the 1995-2008 period, the figure shows the number of firms that have received their first LHC-related order. The end 
of the sample period used in the analysis is 2006 as highlighted by the vertical dashed line. 
 
 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
The empirical analysis is based on two steps. First, we rely on survival analysis to assess 
whether the collaboration with CERN has increased the hazard of filing a patent for the first 
time. Second, we estimate count data models to quantify the impact of CERN procurement on 
the number of patents filed by LHC suppliers. This can be accomplished because 
collaborating firms have received their first order from CERN over a long time-span that 
delivers a natural partition of statistical units into “suppliers” and “not-yet-suppliers”. In both 
cases we also pay attention to the timing of the “CERN effect”. 
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Figure 2. Time distribution of LHC suppliers: 1993-2006 
 
Notes: figure shows the transition of firms from “not-yet-supplier” (white bars) to “LHC supplier” (filled bars). We equate the transition 
event to the beginning of the procurement relationship. 
 
 
The time variation of firms’ status can thus be exploited in the econometric analysis to 
evaluate how CERN procurement has affected the patenting activity of firms.  Notice that the 
LHC was constructed over the 1995-2008 period, but the empirical investigation relies on a 
panel dataset for the 1993-2006 period. The beginning of the observation period pre-dates the 
start of the construction of the LHC because we are interested in the timing of the “CERN 
effect”. To be sure that such effect does not pre-date the start of the procurement relation, 
some of our empirical specifications include a set of dummy variables taking value one if the 
company will become a CERN supplier in one or two years. The coefficients on such 
dichotomous variables - that act as leads – should be never statistically distinguishable from 
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zero in case of a casual interpretation of the “CERN effect” on firms’ patent applications7. As 
shown in Figure 2, before1995 none of the companies in our sample received an LHC-related 
order. Moreover, we decided to stop our follow-up period at year 2006 rather than 2008, since 
as of 2006 not all of the 896 firms had started their procurement relation with CERN. In fact, 
we have 869 firms changing their status from “not-yet-suppliers” to “LHC supplier”. The 
remaining 27 entities are included as controls.
8
 
 
 
3.2.1 Survival analysis 
We rely on survival analysis to estimate the determinants of the hazard of patenting (Kiefer, 
1988 for an overview of survival analysis in economics). Since we are interested in observing 
the transition of statistical units from the status of “not-patenting” firm to that of “patenting” 
firm, we excluded entities that have filed patents before 1995. This is a strict criterion that 
leaves us with 740 firms, out of 896, for which a balanced panel dataset is available. Among 
them, 158 (21.4%) have filed their first patent after the beginning of their collaboration with 
CERN. 
We consider the Cox Proportional Hazard model (Cox, 1972) that specifies the hazard 
of patenting of firm i in year t as: 
𝜆(𝑡|𝐗𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡) = 𝜆0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑘𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝐗𝑖,𝑡𝛃 + 𝛿𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑐,𝑡 +∑ 𝛼𝑠𝑠 +∑ 𝛼𝑐𝑐 ) 
the hazard rate,(.), is the instantaneous probability of applying for a patent in year t for the 
first time for firms that have not yet filed a patent by year t. The baseline hazard, (t), is a 
function of time alone. The exponential function ensures that (.) is nonnegative and acts as a 
                                                             
7 As shown in Section 4.2 our results are unaffected if the leads are omitted from the model.  
8 As explained in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, empirical analyses rely on samples of different size. The survival analysis 
includes 740 firms. As of 2006, 716 of them had changed their status from “not-yet-suppliers” to “LHC 
suppliers”. Count data models are estimated on a sample of 100 firms. As of 2006, 99 had changed their status 
from “not-yet-suppliers” to “LHC suppliers”. 
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scale factor that makes the baseline hazard proportional to the vector of the covariates Xisc,t. 
This vector includes all explanatory of the variables – including the dummies – appearing on 
the right-hand side of Equation 1. 
The dummy variables 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  is set to one if the procurement relation with CERN 
started k years ago. The contribution of country c to CERN budget in year t – expressed as 
percentage of the total contribution of Member States – is denoted as pctc,t. This variable 
controls for country heterogeneity: it captures the fact that firms located in countries 
contributing more, might have a higher probability of receiving an order and hence to benefit 
from knowledge spillovers. This also because of the official CERN policy of balancing orders 
across Member States. Additional factors capturing unobservable country-specific 
heterogeneity are modelled with country dummy variables, c. Similarly, we also include 
sector specific dummy variables whose aim is to allow the baseline hazard to vary across 
sectors. 
The vector Xi,t includes firm-level control variables used to capture factor that might 
affect the absorptive capacity of firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In fact, following Autio 
et al. (2004) we posit that industrial learning effects of BSC are generated by their dyads with 
firms (i.e. a “dyad” is a relationship between organizations). Whether firms can exploit 
knowledge spillovers will depend both on the firms’ absorptive capacity and on the absorptive 
capacity of the dyad (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), namely the sum of relation-specific assets 
that facilitate both knowledge disclosure and knowledge communication within the dyad. 
The effect of firm size on the hazard to file the first patent is captured by dichotomous 
variables classifying firms into small (i.e. the reference category), medium, large and very-
large. This classification - provided in the ORBIS database - exploits information on the 
amount of total assets, operating revenues and the number of employees. Firm size is 
expected to be positively associated with the hazard to patent because large firms can exploit 
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economies of scale, have access to a broader pool of highly qualified collaborators 
(Fernández-Olmos and Ramírez-Alesón, 2017) and have more financial resources to afford 
the costly process of patent application (see Block et al. 2015, Blind et al. 2006, and Leiponen 
and Byma, 2009, among the others).  
We also include in 𝐗𝑖,𝑡 a dummy variable (Hi-techi) that exploits the technological 
intensity of the orders received by firms to classify them as hi- or lo-tech. Hi-tech firms (i.e. 
those that have received at least one order classified as hi-tech by CERN experts) might have 
higher absorptive capacity and be more capable of translating hi-tech orders from BSC into 
marketable innovations (Castelnovo et al., 2018; Hameri and Vuola, 1996; Edquist and 
Hommen, 2000). Details on the construction of this variables and robustness checks of results 
based on an alternative definition of firms’ technological intensity are presented in the 
Appendix A2. Lastly, we consider the (logarithm of the) total amount of LHC orders received 
by firm i (Orderi) as a proxy of the involvement (e.g. joint meetings over several years) and 
continuity of the procurement relationship with CERN (Åberg and Bengtson, 2015). In fact, 
as previously mentioned, long-lasting collaborations for hi-value orders often involve 
repeated interactions with CERN that might boost the learning effects of procurement (Autio 
et al., 2004; Florio et al., 2018). 
 
3.2.2 Count data analysis 
Since the aim of the survival analysis is assess whether LHC procurement is positively 
associated with an increase in the hazard to patent for the first time, we rely on the subsample 
of LHC suppliers that have never filed a patent before 1995. With count data models we want 
to quantify the incremental number of patents that firms filed after the beginning of their 
relationship with CERN, therefore we focus only on firms that have filed at least one patent 
since their incorporation. This leaves us with exactly 100 firms for which a panel dataset over 
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the 1993-2006 period is available (i.e. a total of 1400 observations). The main driver of the 
reduction of the sample size is the inclusion of a proxy of R&D spending in our empirical 
analyses. Robustness checks involving changes in this sample design are discussed at the end 
of Section 4.2. 
Because the number of yearly patent applications filed by firms is a count – that is, a 
non-negative integer-valued variable - with many zero and ones, we estimate both Poisson 
and Negative Binomial models. The expected number of new patents filed by firm i each 
year, pi,t, can be written as follows: 
𝐸(𝑝𝑖,𝑡|𝐗𝑖𝑠𝑐,𝑡) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(∑ 𝛾𝑘𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
𝑘 + 𝐗𝑖,𝑡𝛃 + 𝛿𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑐,𝑡 +∑ 𝛼𝑠𝑠 +∑ 𝛼𝑐𝑐 + ∑ 𝛼𝑡𝑡 ) 
Many explanatory variables in Equation (2), including some of the firm-level controls in the 
vector Xi,t, have already been introduced in Section 3.2.1. Regressions now include a set of 
dichotomous variables (𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 ) capturing the effects of CERN procurement on patenting 
over time.
9
 We also add time dummies (t) to control for common macroeconomic shocks 
hitting all firms in the sample. Macroeconomic conditions are expected to affect the 
profitability of firms, the business environment where they operate and the relationship 
between technology collaboration networks and innovation performance (Fernández-Olmos 
and Ramírez-Alesón, 2017). The logarithm of Intangible Fixed Asset
10
 (IFAi,t) proxies R&D 
expenditure (Chan et al., 2001; Leoncini et al., 2017; Marin, 2014). R&D expenditure is a key 
control variable for analysing patent activity (Hall et al., 1984; Hausman et al., 1984; Aghion 
et al. 2013; Gurmu and Pérez-Sebastián, 2008), but unfortunately the proxy we use features 
many missing observations. However, other proxies of R&D expenditure available in the 
ORBIS database feature an even higher number of missing observations. To include IFAi,t, 
                                                             
9 A similar approach was proposed by Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) in a completely different domain of 
analysis. 
10 Intangible fixed assets recorded in the Orbis database include all intangible assets such as formation expenses, 
research expenses, goodwill, development expenses and all other expenses with a long-term effect. 
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while maintaining the size of the panel dataset reasonably large, we excluded firms reporting 
more than 4 missing values.
11
 Robustness checks concerning this issue are discussed in 
Section 4.2.  
Lastly, following Blundell et al. (1999), we use the mean pre-sample patent count (i.e. 
Avg. pi, the average number of patent applications per year in the thirty years before 1993) to 
capture the firm’s unobserved propensity to patent. This variable captures unobservable firm-
specific fixed effects reflecting any permanent differences in the level of innovation output 
across firms which are independent of CERN procurement. 
 
4. Results 
This section presents the results of the empirical analysis based on survival and count data 
models. While in both cases we also discuss a wide array of robustness checks, for the sake of 
brevity, the corresponding tables are confined in Appendix A3. 
 
4.1 Effects and timing of CERN procurement on the hazard of patenting 
Estimates of ten different specifications of the Cox Proportional Hazard model - Equation (1)  
are reported in Table 1. Each column of Table 1 reports estimates of the coefficient on a 
distinct “CERN effect” variable: 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  for k = 0, 1, …, 9. Recall that 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the procurement relation started k years ago. Therefore, the coefficient 
on 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
0  measures the change in the hazard rate in the year of the first LHC-related order. 
Similarly, 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
1  captures the variation of the hazard rate one year after the first order, and 
so on and so forth. 
 
 
                                                             
11 To have a balanced panel dataset, missing observations have been substituted with zeros and a dummy 
variable taking value one for such observations is included in regressions. 
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Table 1. Cox proportional hazard model for start of patenting activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8 k ≥ 9 
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑘  0.034 0.043 0.046 0.054** 0.067*** 0.080*** 0.088*** 0.071* -0.009 0.034 
 (0.047) (0.037) (0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.040) (0.059) (0.073) 
           
Hi-Techi 0.133 0.131 0.132 0.130 0.130 0.135 0.143 0.147 0.140 0.143 
 (0.176) (0.175) (0.174) (0.175) (0.175) (0.174) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) 
           
Orderi 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.000 0.013 0.010 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.064) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) 
           
Mediumi 0.515* 0.516* 0.517* 0.522* 0.529* 0.533* 0.529* 0.523* 0.519* 0.520* 
 (0.273) (0.273) (0.272) (0.272) (0.272) (0.274) (0.274) (0.275) (0.279) (0.278) 
           
Largei 1.164*** 1.162*** 1.162*** 1.166*** 1.173*** 1.178*** 1.170*** 1.164*** 1.172*** 1.168*** 
 (0.398) (0.396) (0.395) (0.395) (0.396) (0.400) (0.404) (0.409) (0.410) (0.410) 
           
V Largei 2.055*** 2.057*** 2.062*** 2.071*** 2.090*** 2.103*** 2.096*** 2.071*** 2.050*** 2.051*** 
 (0.370) (0.363) (0.362) (0.359) (0.360) (0.359) (0.362) (0.367) (0.379) (0.378) 
           
pctc,t 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
c  yes Yes Yes Yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
s yes Yes Yes Yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes: country (c) and sector (s) fixed effects have been included in all the specifications. * p-value < 0.10, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value 
< 0.01. Cluster robust standard errors (i.e. cluster is the 2 digits NACE code) in parentheses. The table shows estimates of the coefficients in 
Equation (1) and not hazard ratios. 
 
 
 
Table 1 shows that the association between the LHC procurement and the variation of 
the hazard to file a patent for the first time is characterized by an inverted U-shaped relation. 
In fact, estimated coefficients on 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘   are positive, thus confirming H1, but not 
significant for k =1,2,3  while significant and  monotonically increasing up to k = 6 and then 
they decrease, thus confirming H2. Figure 3 plots the estimates of the hazard ratio associated 
with the estimated coefficients shown in the first row of Table 1 and the corresponding 95% 
confidence interval. An estimated hazard ratio equal to one means lack of association, while 
an estimate greater than one suggests that CERN industrial partners face a higher “risk” of 
filing their first patent compared to “not-yet-suppliers”. As shown in Figure 3, the 90% 
confidence bands for 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  lies above one only for 3 ≤ k ≤ 6. 
This implies that the effect of LHC procurement on the hazard ratio to file a patent for 
the first time takes time to build and shows up with a lag of at least 3 years. Similarly, the fact 
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that coefficients on 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  for k ≥ 8 are not statistically distinguishable from zero implies 
that the association between LHC procurement and changes in the hazard rate vanishes eight 
years after receiving the first order from CERN. 
 
Figure 3. Estimates of the hazard ratio for LHC suppliers 
 
Notes: the figure plots the estimates of hazard ratio associated with the estimated coefficients shown in the first row of Table 1 and the 
corresponding 90% confidence interval. An estimated hazard ration greater equal to one means lack of association, while an estimate greater 
than one suggests that CERN industrial partners face a higher “risk” of filing their first patent compared to “not-yet-suppliers”. CERN(k) is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the procurement relation started k years ago. 
 
 
Moving to control variables, we see that independently of the specification, the 
estimated coefficients on size variables are positive and statistically significant at the 99% 
level for large and very-large firms. In line with the expectations, this suggests that, given all 
the other covariates, for large and very large firms the hazard to patent is higher than for small 
firms, which represent the reference category. All models in Table 1 also include country and 
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sector fixed-effects. The Wald tests of the null hypothesis that country and sector fixed effects 
are jointly equal to zero suggest rejecting the null for both set of controls. 
The remaining control variables are never statistically distinguishable from zero. More 
precisely, we see that, as expected, the hazard to patent is higher for hi-tech firms and increase 
with the percentage contribution to CERN budget of the country that hosts the firm. However, 
none of these variables are statistically distinguishable from zero. This applies also to the total 
amount of LHC orders received by firms; in fact, the coefficient on this variable switches sign 
across specification and there is no economically meaningful explanation for that. 
The existence of a sizeable time lag between procurement from BSC and subsequent 
benefits for collaborating firms is in line with the findings in related strands of the literature. 
Griliches (1979), in his survey of econometric analyses of the R&D-productivity nexus, 
highlights that a bell-shaped lag structure connects firm R&D to changes in productivity; such 
a shape is due to the fact that it takes time before research can be fruitfully exploited by firms.  
 
Robustness checks. The fact that the coefficient on the dichotomous variable used to classify 
statistical units into hi- and lo-tech firms is never statistically distinguishable from zero is 
somehow surprising, given our expectation that this variable might capture some aspects 
related with the absorptive capacity of firms. To verify that the large standard errors 
associated with these coefficients are not due to measurement error, we attempt to proxy the 
degree of technological intensity of firms with a continuous variable that captures the share of 
orders classified as hi-tech. Results in the Section A3.1 of the Appendix show that the 
findings of Table 1 are unaffected when using this alternative criterion to measure firms’ 
technological intensity. 
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Similarly, when we replace the total amount of LHC orders with the (logarithm of the) 
orders count, as an alternative proxy of the involvement and continuity of the procurement 
relationship, our main results remain unchanged.  
 
4.2 Effects and timing of CERN procurement on patenting activity 
Figure 4 displays the number of patents per firm over “relative years” - denoted as k. These 
measure the time from the first LHC order. Therefore, k > 0 indicates that the first LHC order 
was received k years ago. The two horizontal lines in Figure 4 are sample averages for k ≤ 0 
and k > 0. Before the beginning of the relationship with CERN (i.e. k ≤ 0), the sample average 
is 0.31 patents per firm, while after receiving the first LHC order (i.e. k > 0) the sample 
average rises to 0.93. A simple t-test for the equality of means allows to reject the null 
hypothesis and is therefore suggestive of the existence of a “CERN effect” on firms’ 
innovation output. 
The existence of a “CERN effect” is further investigated in Table 2, where we regress 
the number of patent applications per year on a set of dummy variables that track the timing 
of CERN impact on innovation output, controlling for several covariates. Since we want to be 
sure that the change in firms’ patenting activity post-dated the beginning of the collaboration 
with CERN, all specifications include also the leads of the dummy variable marking the 
beginning of the procurement relationship. More precisely, the variable denoted as 
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(−2,−1)
 indicates that firm i will receive the first order from CERN in at most a couple 
of years. 
Both the Poisson and the Negative Binomial models reported in Table 2 are well 
suited for capturing the count nature of the dependent variable. Empirical evidence presented 
at the bottom of the table highlights that our data might be over-dispersed and therefore 
violate the assumptions underlying the Poisson regression model. The Poisson model implies 
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that the variance of the number of patents in each period is equal to its expected value during 
the same time frame (i.e. equidispersion). The Negative Binomial distribution includes the 
Poisson as a special case and allows for both under- and over-dispersion. Over-dispersed 
variables have variance greater than the expected value. 
 
Figure 4. Patents per firm: relative years 
 
Notes: “Relative years (k)” measures the time distance from the first LHC order. Therefore, k > 0 indicates that the first order was received k 
years ago and k < 0 indicates that the order will be received in k years. For each k the figure reports the number of patents per firm. The 
dashed line denoted as “Avg(-11,0)” represents average number of patents per firm over relative years k=-11,…,0, that is before the start of 
the LHC procurement. Similarly, the dash-dotted line denoted as “Avg(1,11)” represents average number of patents per firm over relative 
years k=1,…,11, that is after the start of the LHC procurement. 
 
Models in columns 1-3 and 4-6 of Table 2 include a growing number of control 
variables. The following comments refer to the most complete Negative Binomial 
specification in column 6. Focusing on the “CERN effect”, we see that the coefficients on 
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level only for 5 ≤ k ≤ 8. This 
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suggests once again that there is a considerable time lag separating LHC procurement from 
changes in number of patent applications. Moreover, the coefficient on 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(−2,−1)
 is never 
statistically distinguishable from zero. This is consistent with the expectation that any impact 
of LHC procurement on firms’ innovation output should post-date the start of the relationship 
with CERN and strengthen the causal interpretation of our results. 
Focusing on control variables, we see that the coefficient on “Hi-Techi” is positive and 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, meaning that hi-tech firms on average file 
more patents than lo-tech ones. Size is also positively associated with the average number of 
patent applications. Similarly, we do observe a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between our proxy of R&D expenditure (i.e. “IFAit”) and firms’ innovation 
output. This finding is in line with the vast literature on the R&D-patent nexus (Crépon et al. 
1998; Gurmu and Pérez-Sebastiàn, 2008; Hausman et al., 1984). On the other hand, the 
remaining control variables (i.e. “Avg. pi”, “Orderi”, “pctc,t”) are never statistically 
distinguishable from zero. Lastly, the model also includes a set of country, sector and time 
fixed effects. The null hypothesis that (each group of) these fixed effects are jointly equal to 
zero can always be rejected. 
Comparison with the other columns of Table 2 shows that our main result - the 
existence of a “CERN effect” on firms’ innovation output - is robust to both changes in the 
distributional assumptions (i.e. when considering the Poisson specifications) and to 
modifications of the set of control variables included in the model. The estimates and 
significance of the coefficients on the control variables are largely unaffected by to such 
changes. 
All in all, Table 2 is consistent with the findings of Table 1, and further confirms H1. 
The “CERN effect” is associated with an increase in both the hazard to file a patent for the 
first time and in patent applications. In both cases, the effect shows up with a sizeable time 
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lag, as envisaged by H2. A noticeable difference is that while the technological classification 
of firms leads to a statistically significant increase in the number of patent applications, the 
coefficient on this variable is statistically not distinguishable from zero in the Cox 
proportional hazard model.  
 
Table 2. Count data models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Poisson Poisson Poisson NegBin NegBin NegBin 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(−2,−1)
 0.164 0.167 0.176 0.122 0.151 0.159 
 (0.214) (0.204) (0.207) (0.229) (0.220) (0.217) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
0  0.637** 0.543 0.542 0.546* 0.564* 0.573* 
 (0.324) (0.334) (0.348) (0.315) (0.323) (0.315) 
       
CERN(1,2) 0.271 0.145 0.156 0.191 0.146 0.158 
 (0.236) (0.257) (0.278) (0.255) (0.253) (0.247) 
       
CERN(3,4) 0.482 0.386 0.410 0.226 0.177 0.199 
 (0.341) (0.352) (0.359) (0.311) (0.296) (0.276) 
       
CERN(5,6) 1.293*** 1.147** 1.209** 0.954** 0.927** 0.958** 
 (0.449) (0.487) (0.501) (0.419) (0.397) (0.394) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(7,8)
 1.021** 0.934* 0.955 1.132** 1.190** 1.213*** 
 (0.452) (0.510) (0.612) (0.506) (0.498) (0.471) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
>8 0.808 0.479 0.506 0.187 0.066 0.099 
 (0.544) (0.634) (0.709) (0.508) (0.549) (0.607) 
       
Hi-Techi 0.426** 0.653** 0.673** 0.632** 0.782*** 0.797** 
 (0.193) (0.307) (0.308) (0.259) (0.283) (0.317) 
       
Mediumi 3.098** 2.982** 2.992** 3.301** 3.221*** 3.222*** 
 (1.549) (1.466) (1.449) (1.356) (1.250) (1.244) 
       
Largei 2.983** 2.821* 2.832* 2.921** 2.901** 2.909** 
 (1.492) (1.456) (1.467) (1.311) (1.225) (1.239) 
       
V Largei 4.787*** 4.446*** 4.461*** 4.561*** 4.279*** 4.288*** 
 (1.665) (1.647) (1.677) (1.488) (1.448) (1.472) 
       
Avg. pi -0.041 -0.017 -0.022 0.037 0.138 0.132 
 (0.559) (0.603) (0.614) (0.470) (0.512) (0.511) 
       
IFAit  0.105* 0.108*  0.113** 0.114** 
  (0.059) (0.059)  (0.050) (0.046) 
       
Orderi   -0.011   -0.009 
   (0.097)   (0.105) 
       
pctc,t   -0.030   -0.012 
   (0.024)   (0.036) 
Overdispersion ()    2.1138 1.9905 1.9858 
c 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
s 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t 0.0000 0.0088 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: country (c), sector (s), year (t) fixed effects have been included in all the specifications. * p-value < 0.10, ** p-value < 0.05, *** 
p-value < 0.01. Cluster robust standard errors (i.e. cluster is the 2 digits NACE code) in parentheses. The reference category are Belgian 
small-sized firms operating in the Other Manufacturing sector in 1993. The regression also includes a dummy variable equal to one when 
there is a missing value in IFA. “Overdispersion” denotes the estimate of the variance inflation factor in the Negative Binomial model where 
the variance is assumed to be equal to: var =  ×mean. The over dispersion test for H0:  =1 is: 298.13 (0.0000), 274.01 (0.0000), 271.27 
(0.0000), where p-values are shown in (). 
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Robustness checks. Baseline results in Table 2 rely on a sample design that excludes firms 
reporting more than 4 missing values in IFAit. As a robustness check, we changed this 
arbitrary threshold from 4 up to 6 missing values per firm. Setting the exclusion rule to 5 
missing observations yields a sample of 112 firms (or 1568 observations), while considering 
at most 6 missing values of the variable results in a sample of 121 firms (or 1694 
observations). Our baseline results are robust to changes in the threshold used to exclude 
firms because of missing values in IFAit. Similarly, excluding dichotomous variables acting as 
leads do not affect the estimated coefficients of neither the set of CERN dummies nor of 
control variables. 
We also considered a completely different sample design in which we do not exclude 
firms that have never filed a patent. Adding entities without patents yields to a sample with 
263 firms or 3682 observations. While carrying out the analysis including also companies that 
have never filed any patent leads to a much larger sample and possibly more efficient 
estimates, our main conclusions concerning the effect of CERN procurement on patents are 
not qualitatively different. 
Lastly, we also entertained the same robustness checks considered in Section 4.1. 
First, we changed the proxy of firms’ technological intensity from a dichotomous to a 
continuous variable. Second, we replaced the total amount of LHC orders with the (logarithm 
of the) count of such orders as an alternative proxy of the involvement and continuity of the 
procurement relationship with CERN. In both cases our main results remain unchanged. See 
Section A3.2 of the Appendix. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of BSC on technological innovation. A 
discussion of the earlier literature and qualitative evidence from case studies suggests that the 
main benefits for technological suppliers are learning and reputation, but there are also costs 
in terms of R&D and other investments with uncertain returns.  
We have exploited a unique dataset to empirically test the impact of CERN 
procurement on the innovative output of its industrial partners. Patent applications have been 
used as a proxy of innovation output to investigate two related research questions. First, 
survival analysis has been implemented to assess whether the collaboration with CERN has 
increased the hazard of filing a patent for the first time. Second, count data models provide 
estimates of the impact of CERN procurement on the number of patents filed by CERN 
suppliers. Since collaborating firms have received their first order from CERN over a long 
time-span, we have a natural partition of statistical units into “suppliers” and “not-yet-
suppliers” that allows to investigate the timing of the “CERN effect”. 
Our results show that a “CERN effect” does exist and is associated with an increase in 
both the hazard to file a patent for the first time and in patent applications. This effect is 
statistically significant only with a delay of some years (5-8) from the beginning of the 
procurement relationship. The existence of such a lag between procurement from BSC and 
innovation might signal that learning from technology at the frontier of science and 
translating such knowledge into commercial applications is a medium-long run process.  
There is an important consideration in this perspective. As it has been highlighted by    
case studies, many suppliers facing entirely new technological problems need to initially rely 
on the expertise of people at CERN and to closely collaborate with them. This was the main 
result of Florio et al. (2018), who found that the impact on firms is higher the greater the 
relational governance of the procurement. Sometimes the R&D is implemented by the CERN 
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in the first place and during the procurement relationship firms absorb radically new concepts 
and solutions required for the scientific purposes. After the end of the contract, firms 
reconsider what they have learnt and have to understand where new market opportunities may 
arise in the future. Only at the end of this “learning by interacting process”, industrial 
partners’ own R&D, and the subsequent commercial application of the new product/process 
developed, may start. 
The crucial point is that this process is quite different from the one driving the 
established R&D-patents correlation in the usual business environment (such as in the seminal 
paper by Hausman et al. 1984) as it requires patient firms to invest to find a commercial 
application for the new knowledge arising from BSC procurement. What makes procurement 
for innovation at the frontier of science special is that it poses new technological challenges, 
triggering a sort of ‘surprise’ learning mechanism for firms, in the meaning of Solow (1997). 
This has potentially interesting implications as a complement to other, more established, 
innovation policies. 
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Appendix 
A1. List of the companies involved in the 28 case-studies 
Company Country Size Product Application domain 
3M (SCHWEIZ) GMBH CH Large Cables, insulating products, cooling liquids, safety solutions Industry, safety, healthcare, electronics and energy, general consumption 
A.SILVA MATOS - METALOMECANICA PT Large Energy storage and production Industry 
AEMTEC GMBH DE Medium Advanced microsystems and optoelectronics Industry 
ALIBAVA SYSTEMS SL. ES Small Systems for radiation detectors Science, Medicine, Industrial engineering 
B & S INTERNATIONAL FRANCE FR Small Development of electronic and electro-mechanical systems Science 
BAYARDS ALUMINIUM CONSTRUCTIE NL Large Magnet and Nuclear technology Science, Energy 
BILFINGER NOELL GMBH (ex Babcock Noell) DE Large Aluminium structures Industry, civil engineering 
BRUKER EAS GMBH DE Large Advanced Superconductor Solutions  Research, industry, healthcare, energy 
C.A.E.N. – SPA IT Large Electronic instrumentation Physics research, material science industry, medical industry, homeland security 
CARBOLITE GERO GMBH & CO. KG DE Small High-tech cryogenic systems  Science, industry, aerospace 
CRIOTEC IMPIANTI S.P.A. IT Small Flywheels and scientific installation components Science, railway industry, energy 
ELYTT ENERGY  ES Small Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition  Software - 
ETM Professional Controls AT Large Civil engineering for complex projects Civil engineering 
GEOCONSULT ZT GMBH AT Large High-temperature furnaces and ovens manufacturer Industry, science 
HAMAMATSU PHOTONICS KK ES Large Photonics Technology  Industry, science, healthcare 
HEINZINGER ELECTRONIC GMBH DE Small Precision high-current and high-voltage power supplies Industry, science 
LEYBOLD SCHWEIZ AG CH Large Vacuum components and systems Science, industry, food & beverage 
LINDE KRYOTECHNIK AG CH Small Helium and hydrogen liquefiers and refrigerators Industry, science, healthcare 
M & I MATERIALS LIMITED GB Medium Commercialising Materials for Demanding Applications Science, aerospace, healthcare 
NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS SWITZERLAND  CH Large Software and Hardware Platforms Aerospace and Defence, Energy, Automotive, Industry machinery, Wireless Communications, Science 
NOVAPACK TECHNOLOGIES SARL FR Small Packaging solutions for electronic components Science, Industry 
OCEM POWER ELECTRONICS IT Medium Power suppliers and converters  science, industry, healthcare, transport 
OPTIM WAFER SERVICES FR Small Wafer processing services - 
PFEIFFER VACUUM TECHNOLOGY AG DE Large Vacuum generation, measurement and analysis Industry, science 
SERTEC ES Small Engineering services, test and instrumentation systems Science, aerospace, railway 
SIGMAPHI FR Large Particle accelerators components and superconducting systems Science, industry, healthcare 
SIMIC S.P.A. IT Large Cryostats and vacuum vessels Industry, science, oil & gas, energy 
VOEST-ALPINE AG AT Large High quality steel for sophisticated applications Automotive, aerospace, oil and gas industry, consumer good industry 
A2. Classification of hi- and lo-tech firms  
In order to assign suppliers to the high-tech or low-tech group, we took advantage of the fact 
that in the original database CERN orders are classified by an “activity code” identifying each 
product type with a highly detailed 3-digit level. We used the 2-digit classification, which 
covers around 100 items and was sufficiently detailed for our purposes. In some cases, we 
also inspected the 3-digit classification to better interpret the technological content.  
After a preliminary analysis of the overall distribution of order codes, we followed 
Florio et al. (2016) in identifying the specific activity codes most likely to be associated with 
high-tech goods and services for the construction of the LHC. In some instances, the code 
descriptors were generic (“28-Electrical engineering,” say, or “45-Software”). To minimise 
classification errors, we sampled 300 orders for a more in-depth analysis. These orders were 
placed with 207 different suppliers, 16% of all those who received at least one order for the 
LHC during the period under analysis. The orders thus sampled were then evaluated in detail 
by CERN experts and classified, according to their technological intensity, along a five-point 
scale designed to capture differences in both product specificity and closeness of the 
supplier’s collaboration with CERN:  
 Class 1: most likely “off-the-shelf” orders of low technological intensity;  
 Class 2: off-the-shelf orders with average technological intensity;  
 Class 3: mostly off-the-shelf but usually high-tech and requiring some careful 
specification;  
 Class 4: high-tech orders with moderate to high intensity of specification 
activity to customise products for the LHC;  
 Class 5: products at the technological frontier, with intensive customisation 
and co-design involving CERN staff. 
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We defined high-tech codes as Classes 3, 4 and 5 and then divided the LHC suppliers 
into two broad groups, according to their opportunity to deliver high-tech orders in the initial 
procurement event. According to the activity code assigned to the first order, 68.5% of our 
sample companies are part of the high-tech category, with a slight over-representation of 7.5 
percentage points in relation to the original CERN data (61%). There is some risk of 
misclassification, in that non-high-tech companies may have gained the ability, over time, to 
satisfy high-tech orders, and that many companies received more than one order, which are 
not necessarily all coded alike. However, the data indicate that the first order is generally a 
good predictor of the technological intensity of subsequent ones.  
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A3. Robustness checks 
A3.1 Survival analysis: further results 
 
Table A1. Cox proportional hazard model: alternative hi-tech classification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8 k ≥ 9 
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  0.034 0.044* 0.047** 0.054** 0.068*** 0.081*** 0.089*** 0.072** -0.009 0.034 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.033) (0.047) (0.052) 
           
% HTOi 0.179 0.181 0.185 0.184 0.188 0.195 0.201 0.196 0.177 0.180 
 (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.223) 
           
Orderi 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.011 -0.007 0.002 0.014 0.012 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) 
           
Mediumi 0.515 0.517 0.518 0.523 0.530 0.534 0.530 0.523 0.520 0.520 
 (0.347) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) (0.347) (0.348) (0.350) (0.350) 
           
Largei 1.162*** 1.160*** 1.159*** 1.164*** 1.171*** 1.175*** 1.167*** 1.162*** 1.171*** 1.167*** 
 (0.343) (0.342) (0.343) (0.343) (0.343) (0.344) (0.344) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) 
           
V Largei 2.053*** 2.055*** 2.060*** 2.070*** 2.089*** 2.101*** 2.095*** 2.071*** 2.049*** 2.050*** 
 (0.367) (0.365) (0.365) (0.365) (0.366) (0.366) (0.367) (0.367) (0.369) (0.369) 
           
pctc,t 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
c  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
s yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
* p-value < 0.10, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
Notes: country (c) and sector (s) fixed effects have been included in all the specifications.. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in 
parentheses. %HTOi denotes the share of hi-tech orders on the total number of orders received. 
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Table A2. Cox proportional hazard model: no. orders in place of total order amount 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8 k ≥ 9 
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  0.039 0.044* 0.047** 0.054** 0.068*** 0.081*** 0.089*** 0.072** -0.009 0.034 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.033) (0.047) (0.052) 
           
Hi-techi 0.144 0.181 0.185 0.184 0.188 0.195 0.201 0.196 0.177 0.180 
 (0.215) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.223) 
           
#Orderi -0.073 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.011 -0.007 0.002 0.014 0.012 
 (0.080) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) 
           
Mediumi 0.464 0.517 0.518 0.523 0.530 0.534 0.530 0.523 0.520 0.520 
 (0.340) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) (0.347) (0.348) (0.350) (0.350) 
           
Largei 1.151*** 1.160*** 1.159*** 1.164*** 1.171*** 1.175*** 1.167*** 1.162*** 1.171*** 1.167*** 
 (0.338) (0.342) (0.343) (0.343) (0.343) (0.344) (0.344) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) 
           
V Largei 2.041*** 2.055*** 2.060*** 2.070*** 2.089*** 2.101*** 2.095*** 2.071*** 2.049*** 2.050*** 
 (0.355) (0.365) (0.365) (0.365) (0.366) (0.366) (0.367) (0.367) (0.369) (0.369) 
           
pctc,t 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
c  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
s yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
* p-value < 0.10, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
Notes: country (c) and sector (s) fixed effects have been included in all the specifications.. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in 
parentheses. #Orderi denotes logarithm of the total number of LHC-related orders received by firm i. 
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A3.2 Count data models: further results 
 
Table A3. Count data models – full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Poisson Poisson Poisson NegBin NegBin NegBin 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(−2,−1)
 0.259 0.247 0.229 0.126 0.154 0.130 
 (0.167) (0.161) (0.180) (0.207) (0.193) (0.189) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
0  0.766*** 0.641*** 0.603** 0.522** 0.516** 0.483** 
 (0.217) (0.222) (0.249) (0.250) (0.257) (0.216) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(1,2)
 0.442*** 0.292* 0.251 0.247 0.178 0.135 
 (0.150) (0.155) (0.212) (0.297) (0.283) (0.270) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(3,4)
 0.687** 0.593** 0.549* 0.355 0.298 0.243 
 (0.268) (0.274) (0.296) (0.326) (0.304) (0.327) 
       
CERN(5,6) 1.528*** 1.394*** 1.368*** 1.012*** 0.963*** 0.899*** 
 (0.284) (0.292) (0.357) (0.348) (0.304) (0.316) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(7,8)
 1.297*** 1.264*** 1.165** 1.352*** 1.410*** 1.303*** 
 (0.348) (0.376) (0.553) (0.404) (0.419) (0.390) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
>8 1.076*** 0.807** 0.721 0.235 0.177 0.083 
 (0.337) (0.355) (0.516) (0.574) (0.596) (0.732) 
       
Hi-Techi 0.534* 0.690** 0.648*** 0.641* 0.796** 0.763** 
 (0.284) (0.284) (0.247) (0.336) (0.319) (0.329) 
       
Mediumi 2.659** 2.596** 2.631** 2.707** 2.651** 2.671** 
 (1.281) (1.216) (1.172) (1.233) (1.155) (1.117) 
       
Largei 3.005** 2.926** 2.932** 3.082*** 3.025*** 3.033*** 
 (1.256) (1.267) (1.248) (1.144) (1.137) (1.130) 
       
V Largei 5.519*** 5.173*** 5.123*** 5.274*** 4.890*** 4.855*** 
 (1.395) (1.425) (1.477) (1.254) (1.286) (1.321) 
       
Avg. pi 0.184 0.250 0.286 0.383 0.516 0.536 
 (0.430) (0.438) (0.411) (0.411) (0.427) (0.399) 
       
IFAit  0.121** 0.121**  0.133*** 0.133*** 
  (0.049) (0.048)  (0.051) (0.052) 
       
Orderi   0.035   0.034 
   (0.118)   (0.124) 
       
pctc,t   -0.028   -0.020 
   (0.024)   (0.034) 
Overdispersion ()    3.5123 3.3061 3.3070 
c 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
s 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
Notes: Std. Err. clustered by sector (i.e. 2 digits NACE code) in parentheses; ''Country FE'' (''Sector FE'' / ''Year FE'') shows the p-value 
associated with the Wald test of the joint null hypothesis that country (sector / year) fixed effects are not statistically significant. 
Overdispersion tests (p-values): 414.90 (0.0000), 380.55 (0.0000), 377.23 (0.0000). The regression also includes a dummy variable equal to 
one when there is a missing value in IFA. 
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Table A4. Count data models - without leads 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Poisson Poisson Poisson NegBin NegBin NegBin 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
0  0.555** 0.459* 0.452* 0.481* 0.484* 0.487* 
 (0.253) (0.259) (0.268) (0.255) (0.264) (0.258) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(1,2) 0.179 0.051 0.053 0.122 0.060 0.066 
 (0.167) (0.178) (0.195) (0.186) (0.185) (0.180) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(3,4) 0.378 0.279 0.293 0.142 0.074 0.087 
 (0.271) (0.262) (0.262) (0.232) (0.200) (0.179) 
       
CERN(5,6) 1.181*** 1.031*** 1.082*** 0.863*** 0.816*** 0.835*** 
 (0.372) (0.393) (0.398) (0.330) (0.293) (0.291) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(7,8) 0.901** 0.812* 0.819 1.036** 1.071*** 1.081*** 
 (0.372) (0.433) (0.523) (0.432) (0.413) (0.380) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
>8 0.688 0.356 0.369 0.090 -0.054 -0.034 
 (0.448) (0.529) (0.593) (0.436) (0.472) (0.524) 
       
Hi-Techi 0.433** 0.660** 0.675** 0.639** 0.788*** 0.799** 
 (0.189) (0.303) (0.307) (0.256) (0.281) (0.317) 
       
Mediumi 3.059** 2.942** 2.954** 3.272** 3.186** 3.187*** 
 (1.533) (1.450) (1.429) (1.337) (1.238) (1.223) 
       
Largei 2.954** 2.791* 2.800* 2.899** 2.875** 2.881** 
 (1.475) (1.438) (1.442) (1.293) (1.213) (1.219) 
       
V Largei 4.757*** 4.414*** 4.424*** 4.543*** 4.260*** 4.265*** 
 (1.652) (1.630) (1.651) (1.481) (1.446) (1.463) 
       
Avg. pi -0.054 -0.030 -0.032 0.031 0.129 0.126 
 (0.545) (0.588) (0.598) (0.469) (0.511) (0.508) 
       
IFAit  0.106* 0.109*  0.112** 0.112** 
  (0.059) (0.058)  (0.051) (0.048) 
       
Orderi   -0.007   -0.006 
   (0.097)   (0.104) 
       
pctc,t   -0.030   -0.012 
   (0.024)   (0.035) 
Overdispersion ()    2.1146 1.9917 1.9878 
c 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
s 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Notes: Std. Err. clustered by sector (i.e. 2 digits NACE code) in parentheses; ''Country FE'' 
(''Sector FE'' / ''Year FE'') shows the p-value associated with the Wald test of the joint null hypothesis that country (sector / 
year) fixed effects are not statistically significant. Overdispersion tests (p-values): 299.04 (0.0000), 274.81 (0.0000), 272.15 
(0.0000). The regression also includes a dummy variable equal to one when there is a missing value in IFA.  
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Table A5. Count data models - larger sample (5 missing values in the IFAit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Poisson Poisson Poisson NegBin NegBin NegBin 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(−2,−1) 0.249 0.246 0.241 0.207 0.231 0.227 
 (0.201) (0.197) (0.202) (0.214) (0.213) (0.213) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
0  0.699** 0.596* 0.583* 0.596* 0.600* 0.595* 
 (0.325) (0.333) (0.347) (0.339) (0.346) (0.341) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(1,2) 0.271 0.142 0.134 0.212 0.165 0.157 
 (0.241) (0.261) (0.290) (0.271) (0.269) (0.273) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(3,4) 0.509 0.396 0.394 0.272 0.214 0.200 
 (0.354) (0.369) (0.381) (0.339) (0.330) (0.327) 
       
CERN(5,6) 1.374*** 1.215** 1.237** 1.031** 1.002** 0.982** 
 (0.450) (0.484) (0.505) (0.444) (0.424) (0.434) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(7,8) 1.044** 0.940* 0.921 1.111* 1.156** 1.142** 
 (0.488) (0.535) (0.641) (0.588) (0.572) (0.565) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
>8 0.846 0.532 0.520 0.263 0.126 0.100 
 (0.518) (0.580) (0.660) (0.472) (0.496) (0.592) 
       
Hi-Techi 0.471** 0.699** 0.694** 0.642** 0.790*** 0.780** 
 (0.191) (0.294) (0.293) (0.270) (0.289) (0.329) 
       
Mediumi 3.299** 3.184** 3.200** 3.489*** 3.427*** 3.424*** 
 (1.481) (1.393) (1.370) (1.297) (1.191) (1.176) 
       
Largei 2.940** 2.779** 2.785** 2.909** 2.888** 2.882** 
 (1.467) (1.418) (1.411) (1.286) (1.201) (1.203) 
       
V Largei 4.822*** 4.482*** 4.480*** 4.572*** 4.314*** 4.309*** 
 (1.637) (1.614) (1.634) (1.474) (1.440) (1.449) 
       
Avg. pi -0.063 -0.038 -0.026 0.086 0.182 0.185 
 (0.492) (0.511) (0.503) (0.434) (0.471) (0.459) 
       
IFAit  0.103* 0.104**  0.103** 0.102** 
  (0.055) (0.053)  (0.047) (0.043) 
       
Orderi   0.006   0.006 
   (0.100)   (0.108) 
       
pctc,t   -0.023   0.008 
   (0.027)   (0.033) 
Overdispersion ()    2.2129 2.0988 2.1012 
c 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
s 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t 0.0074 0.0892 0.0003 0.0066 0.0000 0.0000 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes: Std. Err. clustered by sector (i.e. 2 digits NACE code) in parentheses; ''Country FE'' (''Sector FE'' / ''Year FE'') shows the p-value 
associated with the Wald test of the joint null hypothesis that country (sector / year) fixed effects are not statistically significant. 
Overdispersion tests (p-values): 320.39 (0.0000), 295.94 (0.0000), 294.26 (0.0000). The regression also includes a dummy variable equal to 
one when there is a missing value in IFA. 
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Table A6. Count data models - larger sample (6 missing values in the IFAit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Poisson Poisson Poisson NegBin NegBin NegBin 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(−2,−1) 0.287* 0.299* 0.286* 0.211 0.248 0.233 
 (0.173) (0.167) (0.169) (0.201) (0.198) (0.190) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
0  0.786*** 0.714*** 0.691** 0.660** 0.683** 0.663** 
 (0.261) (0.249) (0.270) (0.268) (0.276) (0.261) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(1,2) 0.421** 0.318 0.295 0.337 0.304 0.279 
 (0.195) (0.207) (0.223) (0.251) (0.251) (0.237) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(3,4) 0.649* 0.573* 0.553* 0.362 0.329 0.292 
 (0.347) (0.348) (0.319) (0.331) (0.324) (0.276) 
       
CERN(5,6) 1.524*** 1.404*** 1.410*** 1.100** 1.087*** 1.044*** 
 (0.417) (0.426) (0.400) (0.431) (0.403) (0.358) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(7,8) 1.192*** 1.143*** 1.099** 1.173** 1.260** 1.212*** 
 (0.359) (0.381) (0.486) (0.507) (0.515) (0.461) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
>8 0.999** 0.760 0.723 0.346 0.268 0.208 
 (0.494) (0.509) (0.553) (0.501) (0.525) (0.556) 
       
Hi-Techi 0.576*** 0.775*** 0.762*** 0.767*** 0.900*** 0.881*** 
 (0.191) (0.289) (0.282) (0.220) (0.256) (0.275) 
       
Mediumi 3.567** 3.464** 3.470** 3.660*** 3.595*** 3.594*** 
 (1.480) (1.353) (1.357) (1.255) (1.114) (1.096) 
       
Largei 3.082** 2.932** 2.931** 3.028** 3.006*** 3.001*** 
 (1.455) (1.373) (1.374) (1.236) (1.114) (1.105) 
       
V Largei 4.950*** 4.570*** 4.558*** 4.621*** 4.318*** 4.305*** 
 (1.624) (1.594) (1.613) (1.420) (1.367) (1.359) 
       
Avg. pi 0.478 0.471 0.484 0.479 0.545 0.555 
 (0.412) (0.423) (0.411) (0.432) (0.434) (0.421) 
       
IFAit  0.105* 0.105**  0.113** 0.111** 
  (0.054) (0.053)  (0.051) (0.049) 
       
Orderi   0.013   0.019 
   (0.084)   (0.087) 
       
pctc,t   -0.023   0.002 
   (0.028)   (0.036) 
Overdispersion ()    2.2623 2.1493 2.1521 
c 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
s 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t 0.0145 0.0882 0.0317 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes: Std. Err. clustered by sector (i.e. 2 digits NACE code) in parentheses; ''Country FE'' (''Sector FE'' / ''Year FE'') shows 
the p-value associated with the Wald test of the joint null hypothesis that country (sector / year) fixed effects are not 
statistically significant. Overdispersion tests (p-values): 356.00 (0.0000), 332.26 (0.0000), 330.38 (0.0000). The regression 
also includes a dummy variable equal to one when there is a missing value in IFA. 
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Table A7. Count data models - with no. of orders in place of order amount 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Poisson Poisson Poisson NegBin NegBin NegBin 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(−2,−1) 0.164 0.167 0.094 0.122 0.151 0.089 
 (0.214) (0.204) (0.226) (0.229) (0.220) (0.231) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
0  0.637** 0.543 0.439 0.546* 0.564* 0.478 
 (0.324) (0.334) (0.363) (0.315) (0.323) (0.303) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(1,2) 0.271 0.145 0.020 0.191 0.146 0.045 
 (0.236) (0.257) (0.325) (0.255) (0.253) (0.270) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(3,4) 0.482 0.386 0.227 0.226 0.177 0.032 
 (0.341) (0.352) (0.393) (0.311) (0.296) (0.303) 
       
CERN(5,6) 1.293*** 1.147** 0.980* 0.954** 0.927** 0.747* 
 (0.449) (0.487) (0.547) (0.419) (0.397) (0.412) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(7,8) 1.021** 0.934* 0.651 1.132** 1.190** 0.940** 
 (0.452) (0.510) (0.693) (0.506) (0.498) (0.474) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
>8 0.808 0.479 0.195 0.187 0.066 -0.174 
 (0.544) (0.634) (0.819) (0.508) (0.549) (0.728) 
       
Hi-Techi 0.426** 0.653** 0.588** 0.632** 0.782*** 0.728** 
 (0.193) (0.307) (0.249) (0.259) (0.283) (0.286) 
       
Mediumi 3.098** 2.982** 3.075** 3.301** 3.221*** 3.274*** 
 (1.549) (1.466) (1.298) (1.356) (1.250) (1.134) 
       
Largei 2.983** 2.821* 2.819** 2.921** 2.901** 2.904** 
 (1.492) (1.456) (1.348) (1.311) (1.225) (1.160) 
       
V Largei 4.787*** 4.446*** 4.427*** 4.561*** 4.279*** 4.289*** 
 (1.665) (1.647) (1.525) (1.488) (1.448) (1.350) 
       
Avg. pi -0.041 -0.017 0.094 0.037 0.138 0.197 
 (0.559) (0.603) (0.500) (0.470) (0.512) (0.451) 
       
IFAit  0.105* 0.099*  0.113** 0.105** 
  (0.059) (0.053)  (0.050) (0.044) 
       
#Orderi   0.156   0.132 
   (0.221)   (0.219) 
       
pctc,t   -0.029   -0.012 
   (0.024)   (0.036) 
Overdispersion ()    2.1138 1.9905 1.9684 
c 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
s 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t 0.0000 0.0088 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes: Std. Err. clustered by sector (i.e. 2 digits NACE code) in parentheses; ''Country FE'' (''Sector FE'' / ''Year FE'') shows 
the p-value associated with the Wald test of the joint null hypothesis that country (sector / year) fixed effects are not 
statistically significant. Overdispersion tests (p-values): 298.13 (0.0000), 274.01 (0.0000), 265.79 (0.0000). The regression 
also includes a dummy variable equal to one when there is a missing value in IFA. 
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Table A8. Count data models - alternative hi-tech classification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Poisson Poisson Poisson NegBin NegBin NegBin 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(−2,−1) 0.188 0.208 0.217 0.147 0.183 0.184 
 (0.218) (0.210) (0.219) (0.231) (0.225) (0.226) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
0  0.666** 0.593* 0.590* 0.578* 0.605* 0.606* 
 (0.327) (0.332) (0.353) (0.320) (0.328) (0.323) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(1,2) 0.310 0.209 0.219 0.239 0.202 0.205 
 (0.241) (0.254) (0.288) (0.257) (0.252) (0.256) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(3,4) 0.533 0.471 0.494 0.288 0.252 0.259 
 (0.348) (0.355) (0.379) (0.322) (0.302) (0.297) 
       
CERN(5,6) 1.351*** 1.241** 1.306** 1.031** 1.021** 1.032** 
 (0.452) (0.483) (0.518) (0.433) (0.410) (0.420) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
(7,8) 1.084** 1.037** 1.055* 1.219** 1.295*** 1.293*** 
 (0.439) (0.494) (0.623) (0.513) (0.496) (0.482) 
       
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
>8 0.871* 0.557 0.584 0.294 0.192 0.199 
 (0.525) (0.585) (0.688) (0.509) (0.543) (0.627) 
       
%HTOi 0.510*** 0.798*** 0.816*** 0.659** 0.833** 0.837** 
 (0.135) (0.218) (0.239) (0.309) (0.333) (0.369) 
       
Mediumi 3.209** 3.153** 3.170** 3.373** 3.315** 3.320** 
 (1.628) (1.532) (1.515) (1.428) (1.326) (1.312) 
       
Largei 3.086** 2.977** 2.992** 2.992** 2.991** 2.997** 
 (1.538) (1.482) (1.504) (1.358) (1.277) (1.290) 
       
V Largei 4.869*** 4.558*** 4.575*** 4.613*** 4.341*** 4.344*** 
 (1.709) (1.674) (1.713) (1.522) (1.483) (1.501) 
       
Avg. pi -0.020 0.017 0.015 0.041 0.148 0.149 
 (0.591) (0.649) (0.653) (0.489) (0.538) (0.526) 
       
IFAit  0.112** 0.115**  0.115** 0.116*** 
  (0.053) (0.052)  (0.046) (0.043) 
       
Orderi   -0.009   0.000 
   (0.098)   (0.104) 
       
pctc,t   -0.032   -0.013 
   (0.025)   (0.035) 
Overdispersion ()    2.0912 1.9560 1.9530 
c 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
s 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t 0.0000 0.0101 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes: Std. Err. clustered by sector (i.e. 2 digits NACE code) in parentheses; ''Country FE'' (''Sector FE'' / ''Year FE'') shows 
the p-value associated with the Wald test of the joint null hypothesis that country (sector / year) fixed effects are not 
statistically significant. Overdispersion tests (p-values): 295.63 (0.0000), 268.21 (0.0000), 265.26 (0.0000). The regression 
also includes a dummy variable equal to one when there is a missing value in IFA. 
 
 
